Chunyu Zhao

Department of Economics
University of Macau
Taipa, Macau SAR, China

(+86)13964461560
zhaochunyu.chloe@gmail.com
https://chunyuzhao-chloe.github.io

Education

Ph.D. in Economics, University of Macau	2023 - 2027 (expected)
M.A. in Economics, The University of British Columbia	2022 - 2023
Honours B.A. in Mathematical Economics (Dean's Honours), University of Waterloo	2020 - 2022
BEc. in Financial Mathematics, Shandong University of Finance and Economics	2018 - 2022

Research Interests

Market Design, Matching Theory, Experimental Economics

Working Papers

Switching Random Priority: A Draft Without Predictable Turns with Inácio Bó

Abstract: Course seats, work shifts, players in a league, and the contents of an estate are often divided by letting agents take turns choosing. Under a serial dictatorship, letting each agent pick all of her items at once protects truthful reporting but concentrates widely desired items in the hands of early pickers. Alternating turns, as in a draft, limits this advantage, but agents who know when they will pick again can gain by strategically postponing private favorites in order to secure contested items. We propose a minimal change to the draft: after each pick, the turn passes to an agent drawn uniformly at random from all agents except the one who just picked. With at least three agents, the resulting *Switching Random Priority* mechanism is weakly SD-envy-free and satisfies weak SD-strategy-proofness, a standard incentive criterion in random assignment. Every realized allocation satisfies *bounded rank concentration*, an ex-post limit on the concentration of highly ranked items, which drafts also satisfy and serial dictatorships can violate. In simulations with Harvard Business School course-allocation data, SRP restores most of the preference satisfaction lost to manipulation in the observed draft and outperforms random serial dictatorship both with and without quotas, at the cost of higher utility inequality than the draft.

Backward Elicitation of Preferences in Strategy-Proof Mechanisms with Inácio Bó and Lawrence Choo

Abstract: We study whether changing preference-elicitation order affects behavior in strategy-proof matching mechanisms. In a laboratory school choice setting, we vary the matching rule (Serial Dictatorship vs. Random Serial Dictatorship) and the ranking procedure (standard vs. backward, eliciting least-preferred schools first). Backward elicitation yields mixed effects: it decreases truthfulness under Random Serial Dictatorship but increases it under Serial Dictatorship. Analysis of decision-making shows participants respond to both payoff differences and perceived school competitiveness, but backward elicitation does not significantly alter sensitivity to either factor.

Papers in Progress

The Informational Value of Historical Cutoffs in Centralized Matching with Inácio Bó and Yubo Tao

Strategy-Proof and Efficient Multi-Object Allocation with Inácio Bó

Presentations

2026: Xiamen University International Workshop on Experimental Economics (scheduled), Inaugural Asia Meeting of the Economic Science Society, Joint Economics Workshop between the University of Macau and the City University of Macau, The Fourth Wuhan Cherry Blossom Workshop on Experimental Economics

Teaching and Research Experience

University of Macau

Intermediate Microeconomics (Undergraduate) — Fall 2026
Teaching assistant, with Prof. Ernest Lai

Advanced Microeconomics (Undergraduate) — Spring 2024, 2026
Teaching assistant, with Prof. Inácio Bó

Math and Econ Camp (Ph.D) — Summer 2025
Instructor

Experimental Economics Laboratory — Spring, Fall 2025
Research assistant, with Prof. Lawrence Choo

Intermediate Microeconomics (Undergraduate) — Fall 2024
Teaching assistant, with Prof. Gary Wong

Public Economics (Masters) — Spring 2024
Teaching assistant, with Prof. Guangzhen Sun

The University of British Columbia

Principles of Macroeconomics (Undergraduate) — Spring 2023
Teaching assistant, with Prof. Chowdhury Mahmoud

Making Sense of Economic Data (Undergraduate) — Fall 2022
Teaching assistant, with Prof. Jonathan Graves

Fellowships

UM PhD Assistantship (University of Macau) — 2023–2027

Software

Python, R, Stata, oTree/z-Tree, LaTeX

Languages

Mandarin (native), English (fluent)

References

Prof. Inácio Bó
University of Macau
Department of Economics
Taipa, Macau SAR, China
inaciobo@um.edu.mo

Prof. Lawrence Choo
University of Macau
Department of Economics
Taipa, Macau SAR, China
lawrence.cy.choo@gmail.com

Prof. Yubo Tao
University of Macau
Department of Economics
Taipa, Macau SAR, China
yubotao@um.edu.mo